Evolution of cooperation driven by self-recommendation.
Cooperators increase the fitness of others at a cost to themselves. Thus cooperation should not be favored by natural selection in a well-mixed population. It challenges the evolutionists since cooperation is widespread. Information spreading has been revealed to play a key role in the emergence of cooperation. Individuals, however, are typically assumed to be passive in the information spreading. Here we assume that individuals self-recommend themselves to those that are about to have new neighbors. Individuals with higher tendencies of self-recommendation are likely to have more neighbors. In this way, individuals are active to spread the information. We analytically obtain a critical cost-to-benefit ratio, below which cooperation emerges. It reveals quantitatively how eloquent cooperators have to be compared with defectors to ensure that cooperation takes over the population. It also indicates that individuals need to be open enough to the self-recommendation to enhance cooperation level. In addition, the critical cost-to-benefit ratio represents the viscosity of the population, measuring how close cooperators are to each other. Our results highlight the role self-recommendation plays in cooperation.